FOREWORD
Immediately after the terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center, NATO members unanimously voted their support for the United States under Article V of the Washington Treaty. This unprecedented action, the first time such a vote has occurred in NATO's history, underscores the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance and its tremendous strategic value for its members. This vote conferred great legitimacy upon any response that the United States will make to those attacks and reminded us that the solidity of NATO allows the United States to defend its interests on the world stage with great confidence about European security.
Nevertheless, the Alliance is not a wholly untroubled or static relationship. In the first half of 2001, there were numerous public signs of stress among the allies as they faced new challenges. Many of the issues involved in these tensions are particularly important to the future of European security and must be resolved for NATO to move forward and continue playing the role outlined above. In order for members of the Alliance states and other interested parties to explore the issues at stake earlier in 2001, the Strategic Studies Institute, together with Harvard University's Belfer Center for the Study of Science and International Affairs, cosponsored a conference to discuss cardinal issues of the transatlantic security agenda. This report presents a summary and analysis of the conference, which took place at the Belfer Center, on March 26-27, 2001 . Although the world and the context within which these issues must be faced have changed greatly since then, the issues have not gone away nor will they do so anytime soon.
THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY AGENDA:
CONFERENCE REPORT AND ANALYSIS
Introduction.
Numerous media accounts give the impression that the Atlantic Alliance is collapsing or in danger of doing so. Certainly unhappiness and concern over American policies enjoy public popularity in Europe at the moment. In fact, these fears are vastly overdrawn; although Europeans allegedly regard America (and President Bush) as a rogue, cowboy state that mindlessly executes people, pollutes the environment, disregards arms control and international treaties, and is generally destroying Western civilization as we know it. More precisely, the disparities between the U.S. and European approaches to international security represent what one report called both sides' sense of mutual grievance. And similar complaints about America have surfaced in every post-war decade. Moreover, often these complaints are as much salvos in each state's domestic politics, as they are presentations of their foreign and defense policies. Thus Pierre Moscovici, France's Minister for Europe, commented that Prime Minister Anthony Blair's reelection in Great Britain was good for Europe because "In the final analysis, Europe is the natural place for the expression of the progressive values that the left, whether Labour, Socialist, or Social Democrat all cherish." 1 Obviously the Bush administration and nonleftist parties across Europe reject this partisan analysis, but it helps explain some of the current mood. Finally, to some degree, these complaints also represent the price of American leadership in Europe.
Nonetheless, serious issues are at stake in the transatlantic dialogue over European security. Consequently, we must overcome the real and serious disputes that affect this dialogue. Therefore as we approach a new period of European enlargement-i.e., the enlargement of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)-repairing the often fractious interallied dialogue is an essential precondition of progress in securing Europe, our most important alliance. With this concern in mind, the Strategic Studies Institute, with Harvard University's Belfer Center for the Study of Science and International Affairs, cosponsored a conference on the future of the alliance with prominent European elites. This conference took place at the Belfer Center at Harvard in Cambridge, Massachusetts, on March 26-27, 2001 . While everyone spoke off the record to encourage an open, candid discussion, this monograph summarizes the issues they raised and analyzes the conference's significance.
The issues discussed included NATO and EU enlargement, these organizations' mutual relationship now that the EU is creating its own defense arm, the European Security and Defense program (ESDP), defense spending and interoperability among the NATO allies, and engagement with Russia on a wide range of issues. Obviously most, if not all, of these issues share a common subtext, i.e., the question of adjusting the transatlantic alliance to changing realities stemming from the enlargement of Europe.
Reaching a functioning consensus on all or most of the key issues that comprise the European and transatlantic security agenda is a vital American interest. The transatlantic alliance enables the United States and Europe securely to project shared power, values, and interests even beyond NATO's borders. 2 U.S. statesmen have always known that, if any one undemocratic power dominated Europe and isolated America from other democracies or if Europe collapsed into constant wars for lack of a legitimate and durable political order, those situations would threaten American security.
If the former condition prevailed, then Europe might conceivably become, in President Thomas Jefferson's words, "a Breakfast for Bonaparte." Europe was the Cold War's primary "theater" so that it did not become a breakfast for Soviet power. On the other hand, if a general European anarchy prevailed, it would lead to the renationalization of European security policies and then to incessant wars in Europe. In that case, the danger was that one, probably antiliberal, power would then ultimately prevail and threaten American security as in World War I.
Furthermore, to the extent that genuine allied solidarity exists, we and our allies can then face issues beyond Europe's geographical boundaries that materially affect European security. These include Mediterranean security issues from Morocco to the Middle East and issues of security in the former Soviet Union. Signifying that common concern for so-called out-of-area issues, NATO has invited the Commonwealth of Independent States' (CIS) governments into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and created its own Mediterranean Initiative. For its part, the EU has established many important socio-economic programs with CIS governments and devised its own Mediterranean Initiative in Barcelona in 1995.
Conversely, diverging approaches to European security issues ensure discord regarding both Mediterranean and CIS issues. That discord generally impedes progress in resolving these issues. Then neither the United States, nor NATO, nor the EU can realize their objectives and interests in those regions. And we know all too well that local conflicts in the CIS and around the Mediterranean can easily become major international crises. These considerations amply justified the discussions at Harvard.
The ESDP.
Although the discussions ranged widely over the European security agenda, the central theme running through them was the enlargement of Europe. European enlargement is a protean concept. Obviously it refers to NATO's and the EU's formal expansion. But it also signifies the expansion of both organizations' missions, agendas, and legitimate concerns about their own and other states' behavior in world affairs.
The EU, beyond its purely geographical expansion, is equally committed to expanding its capacity to confront European security challenges at an early stage through military means. Indeed, its spokesmen and official proclamations, and many individual European statesmen, assert that it now possesses all the means of preventing and resolving conflicts: political, diplomatic, economic, informational, and military. 3 And participants at the conference, particularly the French, strongly reiterated this assertion. Today the EU seeks a global role as a security provider and crisis manager, e.g., involvement in the Korean peace process and more broadly across Asia. 4 The EU seeks to realize this expansive vision primarily by materializing and enlarging the scope of its commitment since 1998 to a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The EU's military instrument here is the ESDP. The EU's assertions concerning its readiness and that of the ESDP for conflict resolution underwent serious and searching scrutiny at the conference.
The ESDP envisions the creation of a 60,000-man ground force along with 100 naval vessels and 400 planes made up of EU members' militaries. The entire force could arrive in a crisis or conflict zone within 60 days. 5 The ESDP's mandate has been officially agreed to be those operations which NATO and the United States decide to forego. Those operations were defined by the West European Union (WEU) in 1992 in Petersberg, Germany, and are called Petersberg missions. They specifically include humanitarian operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and search and rescue operations. Obviously, these operations pertain to conflicts at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict and to peace operations. The EU is also creating a 5000-man police force to enter these conflict zones once they are secured and perform typical police functions, thereby relieving soldiers of the burden of those missions. However, it is not certain that either this police force or the ESDP force suffices to execute the current mission in Kosovo or one of similar scale, should such a situation occur in the future. 6 Accordingly, the real questions concerning the ESDP's utility and viability are, first, the extent to which its members will make the investments needed to realize the ESDP's and the EU's capabilities for conflict prevention and Petersberg operations; and, second, the nature and extent of the ESDP and EU's cooperation with NATO. At the conference several members pointed out that the ESDP's actual military capability remains on paper. As NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson and others have acidly observed, European governments' continuing failure to pay for the necessary defense capabilities undermines the credibility of talk about a European pillar. Indeed 6 of NATO's 11 members (many of whom are EU members, too) who announced they were raising defense spending, actually cut it. 8 This revelation belies at least some of the earlier assertions that Europe actually had turned a corner and was now determined to upgrade its capabilities and defense spending.
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The fact that so many states willfully deceived their allies and NATO is an ominous sign for NATO's robustness and for the EU's aspiration to an exclusive capacity for preventing, managing, and resolving future crises. Moreover, little likelihood exists that defense spending will rise substantially in Europe anytime soon, especially as a recession is now setting in. Indeed, it seems that if one country, like Holland, increases its spending and upgrades its real military capabilities, others cut their defense budget or let it stagnate as France and Norway have done. 10 Although discussions about transnational and shared payments from one state to another for defense procurement are underway, European governments, as well as the United States, still find it very hard to maintain, let alone raise, defense spending and reach their targets for military modernization. 11 Moreover, overall European defense spending in relation to U.S. defense spending is falling in real terms as the Euro and other currencies depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar.
While these trends have important consequences inside NATO; if they persist, they will vitiate all efforts to create the ESDP or make it an effective force. And if the ESDP remains only a paper force, interallied and NATO-EU relationships will become more acrimonious. Then both organizations will lack conflict resolution mechanisms suitable for the kinds of conflicts that we can envision in and around Europe. If the ESDP cannot become effective due to insufficient defense spending, Balkan peace operations will put a greater strain on NATO members than they currently do. That strain could easily stimulate those forces in the United States who believe, wrongly, that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden there and that prolonged peace operations erode U.S. armed forces' military effectiveness and capabilities.
Paradoxically, the upshot of this issue of European defense spending, (if one goes beyond the discussion at the conference) is that creating viable and fully capable European defense forces, some of which can be assigned to the ESDP, is actually in the U.S. interest. For if the ESDP is not viable, neither will NATO be viable. If the Allies or the EU's members, many of whom are the same states, will not pay for a credible ESDP, they will not pay either for NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI) that seeks to overcome the large gap between the U.S. and its Allies' military capabilities. Since the EU will then lack the appropriate coercive mechanisms with which to terminate conflicts, it will have to call on NATO and the United States to save it from a calamity, as in 1995 in Bosnia. And should the Allies continue to shirk their responsibilities for defense, recent or potential new members of NATO will also not appropriate funds needed to bring their armed forces up to an acceptable level of quality and equipment. Thus arguments for NATO enlargement will lose their coherence, and the enlargement process will become a dubious one. 12 We should remember that to field a 60,000-man ground force and equivalent naval and air commitments; the armed forces, either of one state, an alliance, or a coalition, must field troops three times that size to rotate people in and out of the theater as appropriate. Hence, a truly viable ESDP force actually should comprise a trained and modernized, well-equipped force of some 180,000-250,000 troops. If the EU is to become the all-round provider of security that its resolutions seem to intend or at least obtain the requisite capabilities for fulfilling Petersberg missions, the ESDP must resemble or approach such a force by 2003. And it must have the necessary technological base and capabilities in sea and air lift; command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I); logistics; etc., that EU members presently lack and for which they depend on the United States.
As one participant pointed out, in an age of technological revolution, this force must master both the strategic-political and the technological requirements inherent in effective performance of Petersberg missions. Since we cannot assume a priori that Petersberg operations will be brief ones, the forces involved must be able to master a wide range of missions and operations. And because we also cannot take strategic-political consensus for granted, especially if we seek to complete the operation within a reasonable length of time, the participating allies must build that consensus every day. The strategic-political effectiveness of any mission presupposes that consensus and implicitly raises the issue of an effective command system and mechanism for political coordination among EU members and between the EU and NATO. If the CFSP will be that mechanism, it needs considerable strengthening, for beyond it there is nothing else.
Strategic-political effectiveness also requires constant political support for the forces in the field plus steady and consistent funding. Technologically speaking, equipment must be interoperable and up-to-date. Project management must be effective throughout the operation. And forces should be able to survive even in an environment where there are or might be weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Naturally those requirements for capabilities impose a high, and so far unattainable, bar, but as this was a professional military officer's viewpoint, it carried weight. And it brought the discussion of the amount and direction of European defense spending to a truly practical level.
Another professional officer at the conference observed that Europe's forces in stabilization forces (SFOR) and Kosovo forces (KFOR) generally lack the requisite C3I capabilities. Obviously a substantial upgrading in these areas is necessary to field and maintain a truly effective ESDP force. He also observed-and this logic is inherent in a situation where all the governments involved, including the United States, have limited opportunities to expand defense spending-that the programs the ESDP must undertake to match its operational and technological requirements overlap with those needed in the DCI to realize allied interoperability. These capabilities comprise strategic and tactical level operations and include command, control, communications and computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR); precision strike capabilities; logistics; force protection; and the general realization of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Other observers, both in and out of the conference, agree with this argument concerning such vital functions as air and sea lift, C4ISR, and logistics. But not all conference members agreed that there is an overlap between the DCI and the ESDP. Still, a consensus apparently exists concerning not only the deficiencies of European forces in general and of the ESDP in particular relative to U.S. forces, but also concerning the tactical and operational requirements for making the ESDP a truly capable force. The conference as well as leading European military and political figures expressed this consensus. 13 Unfortunately, there was no consensus as to the likelihood of Europe making the ESDP into a truly viable force. Clearly some governments, like France, Germany, and Great Britain if we accept at face value the critiques by some former officers of the Blair Government's newest budget, are unwilling to raise defense spending to meet the true costs of acquiring the relevant capabilities. 14 And some governments, like France as the French participant stated, even profess to see no need to do so.
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While this stance reflects profoundly entrenched domestic political and electoral considerations as well as the absence of a discernible threat to European states' vital interests, it also could doom the ESDP to irrelevance and injure NATO's cohesion. The capabilities gap between America and its allies would soon become even more visible, especially as the United States launches a new round of strategic modernization. And it would trigger more interallied wrangling over burdensharing, leadership of NATO, and so on.
This European stance also reflects a vision of world politics and threat assessment that is profoundly regional while the U.S. world view must necessarily remain global. As British analyst Mark Smith of the Mountbatten Centre for International Studies at the University of Southampton recently wrote, To put it simply, the United States is a globally engaged superpower, and therefore practices extended deterrence and power projection in a way that its European allies do not. The deterrent relationships of the European states are confined to general, central deterrence, and for this reason their military activities with "states of concern" in the Middle East are issue-driven rather than alliance-driven, and conducted through ad hoc "coalitions of the willing" such as the anti-Iraq coalition of 1990. 16 The notion of the EU as an essentially civilian power, coupled with the refusal to squarely address military needs, consigns it to an essentially "sedentary" role. 17 The United States, as a power seeking to bring about, underwrite, and consolidate a global or "new world order," cannot follow that path. If America renounced its global perspective, none of its allies, not just NATO, could then count on it to protect them against the real threats that they face, treaty or other commitments notwithstanding. Therefore the disparate outlooks of our European allies could lead Washington to focus on Asia (including the Middle East) more than Europe and widen the conceptual gaps among the Allies. Allied refusal to fulfill their commitments only confirms those, like former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle, who call European leadership an oxymoron and who believe that we no longer need the European allies because they "are no longer vital to the defence of our interests in the world," or those who support American unilateralist tendencies. 18 If this capabilities gap between NATO and the ESDP widens, NATO, short of manpower, the requisite funding, or technologies, will have to step into the breach left by the ESDP, should a new Petersberg mission become necessary or a new crisis break out in Europe. NATO would then be hamstrung by the gap between shrinking U.S. capabilities in Europe and the still greater shrinkage of European capabilities that seems to be occurring.
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Therefore U.S. Air Force General Joseph Ralston, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), testified to Congress that the gap between the United States and its allies is his most serious problem. 20 While some European members of the conference insisted that the ESDP "train has left the station," American discussants were notably more skeptical and cited the gap between rhetoric and reality. Some of them also argued that the capabilities needed by the ESDP and those needed to fulfill the DCI do not overlap. The ESDP might need capabilities that duplicate those of NATO, while the DCI's program should not seek to provide the Europeans with capabilities that duplicate NATO's existing ones but rather with complementary ones. While political leadership at the highest level in each state will have to decide those questions, if the perception grows that there is no threat, no need to spend more and modernize, and no need to reform European economies to provide their forces with updated systems, the ESDP will not be viable. If it does materialize under those conditions, it will only do so then at the expense of NATO and allied cohesion.
The military officers and many others at the conference agreed that the potential gap between a U.S. military performing higher-order missions and a European force performing smaller-scale missions can be very harmful to allied unity. The officers argued that the ESDP must approximate the size of a reinforced corps, exploit technologies to reduce risks to its men, and reap the full benefit of the RMA and information technologies. Its landpower component must be something more than a long-range strike force, because only armies can occupy territory and vital enemy resources. Otherwise coalition unity will become very problematic. They also lamented the absence of coordinating mechanisms between NATO and the EU at the level of allied command, of an interorganizational consensus on project management between the EU and NATO, and of a complete tool bag of instruments needed for conflict prevention or peacebuilding.
At least two American discussants also raised the issue of the absence of sufficient police forces, e.g., in Kosovo, despite commitments to send them. Despite the EU's claim that, thanks to its declarations on the ESDP and accompanying police forces, it now disposes of all the instruments necessary to be an autonomous provider of security to resolve or prevent conflicts, it was painfully clear that, in fact, this was not the case. Moreover, unless the requisite political and economic commitments were present, this claim would also not be accurate in the future.
Ultimately, the political commitment of the governments involved will determine the ESDP's destiny. And because that is a political question par excellence , it is the main question confronting all those who seek to convert the ESDP into a reality. But if the ESDP becomes a reality, then the relationship between the ESDP and the EU on the one hand and NATO on the other (or perhaps between at least some European governments and Washington) will become even more intense an issue than it presently is. For the ESDP to become a truly viable force, its relationship to NATO must be worked out in advance of crises, not on an ad hoc basis. Not surprisingly, even though the issues discussed above determine the ESDP's fate; this political or "architectural" question of EU-NATO relations was the main subject of the conference's discussions.
NATO and the EU/ESDP.
Unless NATO and the EU can devise a mutually beneficial relationship, progress in building a secure Europe that is whole and free will stagnate, and Europe could even regress towards the past. Yet, although an American participant in the conference called this question largely a "theological one," theology, whether it is sacred or civil in nature, still divides states and can even cause wars. Therefore, even at the risk of evading other pressing issues, the participants felt obliged to take up this issue once again.
American suspicions of the ESDP and of some governments' intentions are still very strong even if President Bush, as an American participant reminded us, blessed the idea in his initial meetings with Prime Minister Blair in February 2001. However that blessing was conditional upon the ESDP remaining subordinate to NATO or at least not independent of it. 21 Certainly the Pentagon and some officials of the State Department still harbor reservations about the ESDP and fear it will become a stalking horse for France's continuing and not so hidden desire to remake it into an independent European Army, completely separate from NATO. In that case the ESDP would become, to some degree, an instrument of French national interests. 22 In general, French policy reveals a constant temptation to push the envelope on the ESDP. At the same time, this French temptation embarrasses the Blair government and attracts U.S. criticism. As Blair charged during his reelection campaign in 2001, his opponents in the conservative Party were "pouring poison" into U.S. ears concerning the ESDP. Furthermore, he added, "If we don't get involved in European defence, it will happen without Britain. The those people who really have an agenda to destroy NATO will have control of it." 23 Though he denies it, it is widely assumed that he meant France or at least key figures in the French government. This French temptation is reflected in earlier statements by President Jacques Chirac, a statement at the time of the conference by French Chief of Staff General Jean-Pierre Kelche, and in remarks by the CINC of the ESDP, Finnish General Gustav Hagglund. 24 This same temptation also manifested itself at the conference even if French participants avoided the buzz word "independent" and kept to the EU's agreed term, "autonomous." 25 Nevertheless, this temptation, and other EU leaders' accompanying assertions concerning the EU's global role and genuine military relevance in providing security and preventing and resolving conflicts, cannot but inflame suspicions here and abroad about the EU's ultimate objectives vis-à-vis the United States. 26 There is also perhaps some reason to be concerned that certain members of the EU, e.g., German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, envision the ESDP as a project that will take us beyond the sovereignty of the nation-state whose principal feature is that it alone can legitimately command its troops or designate them for command under other authorities.
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If the ESDP evolves into such a supra-national organization that reserves for itself the most decisive powers of the state, it will stand in sharp contrast to NATO which is, first of all, an alliance of fully sovereign states that was created to defend that sovereignty. Second, such an evolution would put the ESDP into direct confrontation with the Bush administration, and perhaps broader American political trends that emphasize an uncompromising assertion of America's sovereign rights and refusal to be bound by a nonelected European bureaucracy. 28 While this issue of NATO-ESDP relations may seem to be an academic or "theological" question, it clearly is a question of utmost importance. For if this interorganizational relationship breaks down or even merely malfunctions, that failure will have enormous and enduring repercussions. This issue is particularly important to those states who may be members of NATO but not EU, like Turkey or Canada, or to states who are applying for membership in either or both organizations, like the Baltic states, or to those states who are members of the EU, but not NATO, e.g., Finland and Sweden.
This last point emerged with particular clarity from a Finnish participant who argued that Europe should be undivided, and strong, if not necessarily militarily self-sufficient. There should be no conflict between European integration and transatlanticism. But if such a dispute does occur, the transatlantic principle should be preeminent. This point is crucial for Europe's smaller states who almost unanimously insist on a strong transatlantic relationship and a leading U.S. role in Europe. They rightly fear that otherwise they and their interests will be sacrificed on the altar of the competing national interests of the major allies: France, Germany, and Great Britain. They also fear that one or more of those governments might be tempted to make a deal with Russia at their expense.
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This standpoint is not confined (though one might expect it to be) solely to states bordering Russia, although they feel this sentiment quite strongly. Therefore these governments emphasize the centrality of NATO, the incarnation of transatlanticism, in their and NATO's relationship to the EU. In this connection, many smaller European states, not just Poland and the Baltic states, clearly still have well-founded reservations about Russian policy. 30 Since Russia still stands aloof from the normative moral-political-military values that make up Europe as a political community and continues to threaten military reprisals against the Baltic states for joining NATO or to place tactical nuclear missiles in Kaliningrad, these small states' fears are justified as prudent long-term policies.
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It is, in fact, a mark of the failure of Russian reform that 10 years after the end of Communism, Russian policies are still universally regarded as unpredictable. Therefore, it is not surprising that a U.S. participant argued that Lord Ismay's famous remark that NATO's purpose was to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out, still had validity despite Germany's unification and pacification and the end of Communism and the Soviet empire. While enlargement hedges against a future resurgent Russia since present-day Russia cannot play that aggressive role, both NATO and EU enlargement also represent an effort to establish a gravitational field upon Russia to pull it into Europe as a full member of this normative and security community.
However, Russia is no longer necessarily the primary or only justification for NATO enlargement or for NATO's primacy as a security provider. Both this American and his Finnish counterpart as well as many other speakers, including some from the NATO organization itself, stressed that NATO must expand not only geographically but must also confront the new security agenda that still divides and confronts Europe. NATO must face many nonmilitary or soft security questions and continue to become as much an instrument for crisis management and collective security as for collective defense. This American speaker stressed that at least some would welcome (as the Clinton administration clearly did) NATO becoming the preferred European security mechanism for "out-of-area" challenges beyond NATO's present boundaries.
Certainly some American analysts strongly espouse this viewpoint, and it has many supporters in the United States.
For example, a recent Rand Study of NATO by David Ochmanek contained this statement, The Balkans, in short, provide a test of the extent to which NATO's members are prepared to use their military forces (as well as their limited economic and diplomatic resources) in operations that aim to redress situations that threaten common yet rather amorphous interests. The Balkans are also a factor hastening the evolution of the Alliance towards a future in which out-of-area peace enforcement operations are seen-by its members and, increasingly, by the broader international community-as an accepted part of the Alliance's raison d'etre . The alliance needs to adapt its military strategy to today's reality: the danger to the security of its members is not primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective interests beyond their territory. Shifting the alliance's emphasis from defense of members' territory to defense of common interests is the strategic imperative. These threats include the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other regions that threaten to cause great disruption. To deal with such threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can accomplish goals beyond NATO territory. 33 As the conference's discussions showed, this view is not universally accepted. Many participants even expressed the fear or presentiment that Western security institutions do not keep pace with the new challenges. This disagreement showed two things. First, it revealed the discord within the Alliance about how to respond to new challenges or threats like proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Second, it revealed at least a rough consensus as to what those new challenges are and an admission that it is very difficult to find the appropriate mechanism by which to respond to them collectively, either in EU or in NATO. While a rhetorical consensus exists that NATO and the EU must adapt to new realities and challenges; nobody knows quite how to do so or how to map out a road for doing so.
We must view the discussion about NATO-EU/ESDP relations in that context. At least some American participants with wide experience in Europe and many of the West European conferees agreed that Europe will not long remain militarily impotent, and that the solidity of the previous transatlantic connection will inevitably weaken in the absence of a common enemy. Indeed, one American who argued these points went further and stated that EU enlargement should precede any subsequent NATO enlargement, although this is frankly a remote possibility. He cited, as did the French participant, French grievances over NATO's Southern Command as critical factors in Paris' disaffection. The French discussant also argued that in any future European conflict the United States may not act, obliging Europe to defend itself.
These last points provoked a lively discussion. German members and former military officers there rejected France's "grievances" and emphasized that NATO's success depends upon the quality of U.S. leadership. Kosovo pulled NATO in multiple directions only because that leadership was incoherent in 1998-99. Nonetheless, only the United States can take a leadership role in managing Russia's decline, China's rise, and the defense of Europe. Unfortunately, European states cannot count on Europe to defend their security unconditionally, a point made equally strongly by Estonian participants. This observation is in line with the lessons of Bosnia for, as former Supreme Commander of Swedish Armed Forces General Ole Wiktorin observed, in reference to Bosnia's wars, "As a result of Bosnia and other armed conflicts we have come to accept war on European territory. The message is, in particular for a small nation, that, if you do not take care of your security, no one else may care." 34 This Estonian viewpoint, shared by many, if not all, observers in the Baltic states, reaffirms the centrality of the U.S. presence in Europe to any true sense of security there. It reflects smaller states' quite rational apprehensions concerning their larger allies. As the EU's Nice summit of December 2000 and continuing Franco-British-German differences concerning the future direction of the EU indicate, concerns about other states' relative gains, e.g., Germany's power after unification or French and German power in the future EU organization, still drive much of governments' foreign policies. These concerns make it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve unified European policies. As former German Chancellor Helmut Kohl observed, Germany's dominance "would necessarily provoke fear and envy among all our neighbors and move them toward common action against Germany." 35 Any government that assumed the EU could soon lead Europe even after creation of a supposedly independent CFSP and ESDP based on the postulate of a harmony of interests on all issues of European security, not to mention "out-of-area" issues, would be both wrong and deluded. And that error and delusion carry the risk of dangerous outcomes. Therefore such illusions must not govern policy formulation.
Europe, according to this argument, rather than rushing off to a united policy, actually craves the American umbrella, for without it a "security competition" based on a renationalization of foreign and defense policies would necessarily ensue as Kohl and other European elites believe. 36 European pleas for American action and leadership in Macedonia forcefully confirm that point. While such a competition, absent American leadership, may not lead to wars like those of 1914 or 1939, it would probably lead to regional blocs, spheres of interests and of influence, and old time power politics. Central European officials, despite their friendship with Germany, desire NATO membership, not only because of their residual fears of Russian policy, but also because they do not want to be left alone in Europe with a unified Germany. 37 And Berlin, as Kohl's remarks show, knows it.
Thus Washington cannot and should not take European integration and unity for granted. Similarly, support for one or another brick in the West European security architecture is generally motivated as much by fears of other states' relative gains or an attempt to make such gains as they are by a desire to do something for Europe. Thus when we hear politicians or analysts tell us that Europe has reached the millennium and has renounced power politics, etc., or identify their state's interests with those of "Europe," Bismarck's acid comment that politicians who invoked the name of Europe generally did so because they were afraid to ask for something that was in their selfish national interest, comes to mind.
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The French participant as much as confirmed that the Anglo-French initiative at St. Malo in 1998 that triggered the creation of the ESDP derived from Europe's awful Bosnian and Kosovo experiences and the common determination to avoid exclusive reliance on an uncertain U.S. policy. This explanation does not exclude other considerations like Blair's desire to play a bigger role in Europe by an accord on defense, the only instrument available to London to pursue this goal. A British participant confirmed this point. 39 This participant also argued that the new ESDP would be wholly transparent to NATO since 11 states are members of EU and NATO. He added that the EU's Nice summit agreed to extensive preparations for transparency and consultations with NATO, more or less giving NATO the first right of refusal on any future military contingency that falls within the scope of Petersberg missions and on the use of its equipment and forces for an ESDP operation. 40 He, too, argued that these decisions rendered the issue of the NATO-ESDP relationship a "theological" one. While U.S. participation is ensured by the Nice agreements, he argued that a European defense force will eventually be decided. The Nice accords only provided for crisis management, and members of the ESDP/EU will not support anything beyond that if the issue becomes the American commitment to NATO, for nobody wants to make that commitment an issue.
Nevertheless, even this way of presenting the question made some members uneasy. A German participant warned that Europe did not need Washington to get into trouble and raised the issue of the ESDP's lack of funding and effectiveness. Not only did he cite the widening technological gap among NATO members and between America and Europe, he also worried that even a mission based on Petersberg tasks could foster divided counsels concerning members' objectives and interests. He also worried about obtaining Security Council authorization for Petersberg missions, given Russian proclivities to obstruct such operations. Although he believed that the very effort to realize the ESDP's autonomy will force it to confront and overcome these kinds of issues, he also concurred that Europe will not oppose NATO.
However, this argument, too, did not reassure everyone. Another German participant warned that the ESDP was not ready for action, and, since the EU members were not fulfilling the DCI, it probably would not be ready in time for even small-scale operations. He warned against any distancing from the United States because U.S.-European relations rest on a systematic process of interallied interactions going back years as well as profound economic and generational relations. A British speaker likewise warned about the ESDP, calling its structures "dreadful." He feared a differentiation between European forces who would undertake small-scale Petersberg missions and the U.S. military that would take on the really tough missions. He stated that, while Europe emphasized soft security, the United States stressed hard security. Implicitly, he clearly feared, as did many there, that this perceptual gap could undermine the concept of shared risk that governs NATO operations and split the allies.
Moreover, he openly stated that these "dreadful" EU structures were also undemocratic and untransparent.
Hence, no direct democratic control over the EU's use of forces existed. Given the present controversies in Europe, heightened by Ireland's rejection of the Nice accords over the EU's "democratic deficit" and NATO's insistence upon just such controls, this was a palpable hit upon the idea of an ESDP. 41 Arguably, some analysts also maintain that, unless a true democratic legitimacy emerges, any talk of a legitimate, not to say common, foreign and security policy of the EU will be compromised at the source. 42 Even so, this participant agreed that the ESDP was the only way to persuade Europe to spend on defense since it would have ownership of the idea. The ESDP was also an insurance policy against a contingency from which the United States would, in fact, abstain.
Some participants agreed with this last point and called for the United States to loosen export controls to allow for interoperability and for Europe to master and implement the RMA. An American participant from the State Department observed that not only did the administration support ESDI, the Pentagon and other reservations notwithstanding, the United States had also listed some 17 steps to facilitate this loosening of export controls at the Florence meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in 2000. It is now up to industries who wish to play in foreign markets to ease burdensome licensing agreements and restrictions. Otherwise, the call for loosening export controls did not provoke much discussion.
However, it is clear that there was a great concern, not only among Americans, that the ESDP would be a fiction until and unless the financial and technological issues, signifying real political will in European capitals, were satisfactorily addressed. On this last point, some disagreement ensued, specifically over the question of whether the DCI and force planning and building requirements for the ESDP overlapped. Some argued that they did, in fact, overlap, presumably because these forces all belonged to members of both EU and NATO. Alternatively, these processes overlapped because of the commonality of the technologies involved in both processes. Others disagreed with this outlook. A former officer insisted that we do not have common EU and NATO force standards, and NATO should not accept the claim of those who have done nothing to improve their capabilities. Rather, it should publicly name and shame them and insist upon modernization, not only for aspirants to membership but also for members. Something resembling that process has taken place vis-à-vis the Czech Republic, although it is too early to say whether that will achieve the desired objectives in the foreseeable future.
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NATO Enlargement.
The foregoing discussion and analysis suggest the importance of NATO enlargement for the West, the candidates, and for Russia; and why the next round of enlargement will crucially affect so many state destinies in Europe and North America. Here the discussion was particularly revealing. First of all, there were few divisions among the participants. Everyone concurred with the frequently stated view that it was necessary now to begin discussing the criteria for new members to be invited in November 2002 at NATO's Prague summit. Even more surprising was the general agreement that it was up to Washington to define the NATO consensus concerning criteria and who should be invited at Prague, and that, if it did so, NATO would follow its lead. Obviously this is a far cry from the terrible press the United States recently was receiving in Europe.
This last consensus transcended the conference's discussions. President Jacques Chirac of France, on his Baltic trip in July 2001, said that the decision about Baltic membership in NATO was essentially Washington's decision. Moreover, he also strongly hinted at support for their membership in both NATO and EU. 44 One suspects this consensus emerged at NATO's Brussels summit in June 2001 and owes much to President Bush's Warsaw University speech, laying out an expansive and inclusive vision of the future map of European security.
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Even so, the issues involved in this consensus were the subjects of a vigorous discussion. One question is whether NATO will respond to "out-of-area" crises and challenges beyond Europe and, if so, how. Another question is how NATO and Russia are to relate to one another so that Russia truly integrates as a democratic, peaceful, status quo power into Europe.
Baltic participants naturally strongly advocated their membership, underscoring their commitment to a democratic order and to liberal and cooperative security perspectives. They also insisted that they are taking the requisite military steps to bring their military forces and defense spending to levels compatible with NATO's demands. They stressed that their actions indicate both their ability and desire to contribute to European security rather than to be mere security consumers. Not surprisingly, they urged NATO to disregard Russian objections and reiterated that Russia continues at every opportunity to pressure and threaten them or to conjure up new and spurious issues and charges to retard or prevent Baltic membership in NATO. At the same time, they insisted that only NATO, and not the EU's notional "rapid reaction forces," can defend them against real threats. They see NATO enlargement not in terms of preserving or extending new dividing lines in Europe but rather as a way to end the ambiguity of the Baltic states' status and Russia's talk of red lines. NATO and EU must show that Russia no longer can define for itself a privileged sphere of influence in the Baltic or in Europe more generally. Indeed, if Russia truly considers using tactical nuclear weapons in Europe against the Baltic states and NATO, then that is all the more reason to act and not hold back.
While one speaker argued personally for Baltic membership and insisted that no Baltic state's membership threatened Russia, he equally insisted that NATO must engage Russia (although neither he nor anyone else could say exactly how or to what end this engagement should proceed). He also lamented Russia's seeming inability to come to grips with the new view of security and the inclusive approach now being employed by NATO. He cautioned against saying who will get in now in order to maintain the momentum for continuing reforms among applicants and believed that Russia may not like enlargement but will accept it.
Although the Russian participant disputed many of these points, most of the discussion on enlargement did not revolve around the merits, or lack thereof, of the Baltic states' cause. Rather, it focused on the overall question of the military criteria for new members. Speakers from NATO emphasized the importance of the new membership action plans (MAPs) as a tool for engaging applicants politically, economically, and militarily; supporting their economic and military reforms; and giving them affordable targets for defense spending. The MAPs and associated programs also ensured that applicants did not cause problems with their neighbors or with their own ethnic minorities and reformed their security structures.
American speakers, not surprisingly, adopted a much more robust, positive, and expansive view of the goals of enlargement. One saw it as part of a broader Euroatlantic security strategy to make Europe whole and free. While preserving the best of the past and the robust transatlantic tie, NATO would reintegrate European states who had just entered history after being kept in Soviet captivity, engage Russia, stop conflicts, and deal with new threats, including those outside of Europe. Programs like the PfP prepared states for the responsibilities of membership, and alleviated concerns over so-called gray zones of European security. The "alphabet soup" of new programs ensured that all those willing to play by those rules obtained tangible gains, participation in SFOR and KFOR with the Russians, agreement with the Ukrainians, and so on.
Nevertheless, he discerned real concerns about enlargement that had to be faced. There are no more easy choices among the applicant governments. Germany is no longer an engine for enlargement. While the United States must forge the consensus, getting one will be very difficult. Among other things, the new candidates for membership all have a mixed record. The danger exists that, since NATO does not allow its members to fail, they may not reach NATO's standards once they are accepted. NATO enlargement may also not reach those states who are most in need of it. However, NATO cannot accept Russian red lines and should also aim for the so called "big bang," taking as many members as possible rather than meting out regular dosage to Russia.
He insisted that there must be some expansion of NATO and that the MAPs are essential so that those states who do not get in are not stigmatized. We and NATO must help stabilize the Balkans, give economic help for Russian reform, and eliminate the "theological" disputes over the ESDP. NATO must get on with the DCI and have confidence in American leadership and specifically in President Bush. Finally, U.S. leadership is vital to enlargement because there will be intense bargaining under the best of circumstances concerning who does get in.
A second American noted that NATO is not soliciting new members but responding to other states. The concept of an open door means just that, it is open to all who wish to enter. While NATO still has not reached consensus concerning the added value that any particular new members may bring to it, if those who perform best under the MAPs do not get in, that will raise serious questions as to the utility and meaning of the entire program.
This point led to the question of defining the military criteria for new members so that their entry into NATO gives it real added value. Because the MAPs enhance the technical issues of military development and their corresponding purpose is to enhance stability, whatever decision NATO makes will destabilize Eastern Europe because someone will be left out. New members' contributions already have left much to be desired, and there are many structural obstacles to improved military performance throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Consequently, taking in new members will be difficult to justify on military grounds, especially if they have failed to meet their own MAP programs.
This discussion, in fact, set the stage for a comprehensive discussion among the members as to what U.S. policy was and where it was going. The U.S. participant from the State Department said that there was a reasonable amount of continuity from the Clinton administration to the Bush administration regarding the importance of NATO and the Alliance. The United States remains committed to NATO and recognizes that the Alliance makes it easier to solve many more problems than would otherwise be the case. While OSCE is a useful forum for discussing transnational threats, our policy is inclusive and collective. It aims to give everyone a voice. Meanwhile, even the Russians know that NATO is the only effective force for collective security in Europe.
He observed that, despite press accounts, the United States supports the ESDP and wishes to make it work. But the EU must not promise what it cannot deliver. We will not sacrifice NATO enlargement for other goals, but troop deployment decisions probably do not have to be made until after the Prague Summit. Meanwhile, the debate over enlargement has begun, and the key issue is enlargement to the Baltic. Russia has not changed its view about enlargement and believes that European support for the Baltic states is at best lukewarm, or that Europe would like the problem to go away.
It would appear that, while NATO enlargement is an important issue to the Europeans, it is less important to them than the relationship between EU and NATO. Perhaps that explains why they seek U.S. leadership to forge a consensus in order to minimize what would otherwise be a frenzied and fractious Prague summit. NATO's importance and utility are not questioned, and its purposes are universally acknowledged.
The real question for Europe, however, is dealing with existing and foreseeable threats: Russia, strategic arms control, the Balkans, and other issues. It is most interesting in this connection that only one or two people mentioned Ukraine. One American commented that we must focus on Ukraine which he believed was the most dangerous security issue in Europe, much more than the Balkans. Yet nobody else even spoke to that issue. This suggests that most elites still view the Ukraine and any question of Western security involvement in the CIS through a Russian prism. This also suggests that neither Washington nor Western Europe has good ideas concerning helping Ukraine reach stability other than repeated exhortations. Frankly, that may not be enough, given Ukraine's stagnation and political regression especially as it is also not clear what Europe tangibly hopes to accomplish vis-à-vis Russia except through endless dialogue. Neither is it clear what price the West will make Russia pay for integrating with it.
Strategic Arms Control and Weapons Proliferation.
One American predicted that, as happened in Genoa in July, Russia and America would negotiate reductions in strategic arms control concurrently with negotiations on missile defenses. This is part of the Bush administration's new framework for relations with Russia. But it is also clear that the administration will soon "bump up" against the restrictions of the antiballistic missile treaty within 6 months to a year. These negotiations could encounter some major problems by 2002, since there is good reason to suspect that Russia aims to drag this issue out in inconclusive negotiations while it tries to harvest any gains that may accrue to it from the general foreign skepticism about our missile defense program. 46 In that connection, U.S. participants noted the Bush administration's general skepticism about binding treaties and the long drawn-out negotiations that precede them. This skepticism likely is influenced by suspicions that Russia will not bargain seriously and merely play for time. It probably also owes something to the difficulty in passing treaties through Congress. Still, it appears that, above all, the administration wants the flexibility to act in almost unilateral fashion, although missile defense will be shared with NATO. It is precisely this desire for the utmost flexibility that arouses in Europeans the fear of American unilateralism. The administration's perceived unilateralism arouses fears that America seeks to free itself from all constraints in world affairs, to increase its range of strategic options for using force on its own without reference to others' opinions, and even to dismantle parts or all of the system of arms control treaties that has been laboriously constructed over the years. Indeed, some Europeans fear that we will accept Perle's formulation that Europe is no longer vital to American interests, and essentially convert our alliances into purely ad hoc and temporary arrangements or coalitions, leaving Europe both adrift strategically and inferior technologically. Given those perceptions, it is not surprising that more than a few European statesmen publicly voice the idea that the EU is "one of the few institutions we can develop as a balance to U.S. world domination." 47 While this fear of U.S. unilateralism and hegemony may be exaggerated, it is real and must be confronted. Although the State Department participant observed that the Bush administration cannot decide for Russia what its goals and interests are or solve its problems because those are Russia's responsibilities, this may not ultimately satisfy Europe, given Russia's historic importance and geographic proximity. Many U.S. statements that the administration is less likely to make decisions on the basis of what Russia wants and that a vision of U.S. interests takes precedence over everything else confirm his remarks. This U.S. vision is not a general acceptance of all multilateral programs and negotiations but rather, in the words of the State Department's Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, "a la carte multilateralism."
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This is precisely what worries many Europeans whose implicit demand is not only that we engage Russia, but that we do so on the basis of existing arms control agreements.
Clearly this orientation among many, but by no means all, European analysts and governments diverges from what is emerging as the administration's approach to Russia and strategic nuclear issues. As this State Department participant reported, we focus on Russia's strategic potential and aim to maintain strategic stability and reliable command, control, and communications of its nuclear forces. While engaging Russia in dialogue, we do not obsess about it. We will help Russia to help itself, but we should accept that not every problem involving Russia can or perhaps should be solved at once. Finally, we have made it clear that Russian support for weapons proliferation will have real consequences.
At the same time, our strategic review seeks to fashion and sustain deterrence in a manner appropriate to the current strategic environment. Deterrence as we knew it is no longer adequate or sufficient to today's environment. We need a new doctrine because the old one that ensures massive response to attacks on allies does not provide enough options to deal with strategic conventional weapons attacks against them. The current defense review also aims to improve the readiness and sustainability of deployed forces. This requires a high level of investment and a priority on force protection since we are not ready to assume or incur a higher degree of risk for our soldiers. Transformation of the armed forces therefore aims to move to a 21st century force capable of deterring and defeating threats. It entails modernizing C3I and space capabilities and a general reform of Pentagon procedures, structures, and organizations to foster more responsive and effective interallied decisionmaking.
He continued by noting that we are consulting with our allies on the most efficacious architecture against ballistic missile threats from several unpredictable states who could use them, not against Russia or China. This Euroatlantic system will cover and be available to others, including Russia if it is serious about its earlier proposal for a joint Russo-European missile defense. The system will be affordable, and consultations will precede any decisions about architecture. These observations coincide with the fact that many U.S. allies, in and out of Europe, are participating in building defenses against missiles. 49 Seconding these remarks, a British speaker emphasized the need for a process to move Russia and the United States away from locking in high numbers of offensive strategic weapons and towards giving the United States the option of strategic defense and the capability to deter and defeat threats either unilaterally or with allies. We must move away from outmoded ideas of arms control and deterrence, and decouple U.S. and Russian nuclear forces from each other as the administration's proposals would do. The less adversarial U.S.-Russian relationship that would then ensue could also benefit Europe.
On the other hand, relying on fewer and fewer foreign U.S. bases, especially in Asia and on long-range precision-strike weapons, could complicate interoperability among allies. This might again lead to the dreaded division of labor between the United States at the high end of the conflict spectrum and Europe at the lower end. Indeed, unless Europe modernized its forces as promised, Washington might be less inclined to provide both leadership and reassurance.
Looking to new issues, he argued that, while EU should modernize its forces and show more interest in Asian security, Washington should place a higher value on broad multilateral arms control regimes. Instead, it unilaterally focuses on denying capabilities to weapons proliferators rather than engaging them. These remarks encapsulate an increasingly visible difference between U.S. and European perspectives on weapons proliferation where Europe believes in prolonged negotiations and engagement with those states, while the United States allegedly believes in unilateralism and coercion, even force.
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This difference appears to be real, but it also reflects the difference cited above between U.S. global responsibilities and the insularity or parochialism of European thinking. In fact, some European governments are apparently going out of their way to pretend that there are no threats. Spain, for example, has told Libya that it sees no threat to Europe from Libya regarding WMD and is not participating in a U.S. missile defense umbrella for Southern Europe even though Libya's efforts to achieve biological and chemical weapons and a long-range missile capability are well known, and Libya is the only country ever to launch missiles at European allies (in 1986 at Italy in retaliation for the U.S. raids on Libya).
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Therefore, it is difficult to see how engagement alone deters Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, not to mention India, Pakistan, and Israel, from building nuclear and strategic systems to defend themselves. While each state's reasons may vary, in the end they each feel some degree of threat that nobody else is prepared to overcome for them, especially as some, like Iran and Israel, have been overtly threatened or attacked by WMD. And according to some U.S. aerospace executives, here Europe cannot be trusted with American secrets but will sell the technology abroad to weapons proliferators. 52 While Sweden felt sufficiently secure in what was a covert American guarantee during the Cold War to forego nuclear weapons, for the reasons cited above, these governments do not share that feeling and for that matter neither did France or China in the 1950s and 1960s. 53 Moreover, as long as Russia, Europe, and the United States continue promoting weapons proliferation and/or technologies, engagement seems to be an insufficient, albeit necessary, means of reducing weapons proliferators' incentives to go nuclear and their fears lest they do not do so.
Clearly no resolution of these questions was possible here or in the real world at one meeting. But we can be certain that these issues will continue to trouble NATO because officials in both the Clinton and Bush administrations feel strongly that the proliferation of WMD, and perhaps of advanced conventional systems as well, is the greatest threat we face. Europeans, even if they support or do not obstruct our missile defense program, clearly do not feel this way. In many cases, they see little threat from weapons proliferation to their security, thus signifying the gap in threat assessments alluded to above.
54
Either they remain more concerned about so-called soft security threats or they worry more about Russia's future. Therefore they place a higher emphasis on engaging Russia, although they are uncertain about the objectives involved in this engagement. This European disposition also suggests that a unilateral American move toward missile defense without truly substantive negotiations with Russia will arouse great antagonism in Europe.
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Russia.
While Europe's smaller states fear Russia, the larger states also distrust it. Nor can we say that reform and democracy have triumphed or that Russia's national security policies conform to those of Europe. Continuing weapons proliferation, Chechnya, moves to integrate the CIS under its control, and growing signs of a police state all belie the hoped for goals of democracy, prosperity, peace, and security and create much anxiety in Europe. As the distinguished German analyst of Russia, Alexander Rahr, recently wrote, oligarchs, behind-the-scenes intrigues in the upper echelons of power, criminal turf wars, and military operations in Chechnya. These could not but breed apprehensions among the German public concerning their own well-being and security. Thus the likelihood of where Russia would head in its further development-down the path of democratic reforms or in the direction of a criminal state with a totalitarian regime-ceased to be a purely Russian affair and became, as it were, a part of the German home policy. And for that matter, [so] did the elections of the "strongest" man in Russia, the intricate twists and turns of which the German public followed with no less interest than the shaping of their own government. 56 European observers have noted that Russian national security policy diverges from European standards and isolates Russia from Europe. 57 As Quentin Peel of the Financial Times wrote, But the real problem remains Chechnya and all it represents. Unless Mr. Putin can find a peaceful solution to the confrontation in that remote mountainous enclave, he cannot and should not be embraced by the rest of Europe. It represents a continuing affront to basic human rights.
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Unfortunately, as these points were raised during the discussions, when it came the turn of the Russian participant from the embassy in Washington to reply, he did so in a way that confirmed Western misgivings.
He started by charging that the only Russia that would apparently satisfy the West is one that would be hermetically sealed or debarred from military exports or where those exports were fully transparent. This ideal Russia should applaud NATO enlargement and all its works, negotiate with the Chechens, pay its debts, but forgive Ukraine its debts to Russia, and accept that EU enlargement might marginalize Russia in Europe even though it supports that enlargement. He complained that, although Russia has many proposals for European security and a new model for it, it has been denied an equal access to decisionmaking in Europe. Therefore it searches for alternatives by which to defend its national interests. Finally, a new security treaty with NATO that goes beyond the Founding Act is needed.
One suspects that this will be Moscow's price for both the negotiations over missile defenses and NATO enlargement, and that the ensuing accord should, from Moscow's standpoint, turn a blind eye to reintegration of the CIS and the trampling of democracy and democratic controls over the multiple police and armed forces in Russia. Although many Russians, including official speakers, have frequently voiced this litany of complaints against the West, in many respects these complaints are misplaced. It is precisely the refusal to pay debts, negotiate with the Chechens, and accept the fact that it no longer controls the destiny of Eastern Europe or to reform internally that excludes Russia from Europe because these policies antagonize and alarm Europe. While Europe must engage Russia to make it more European, Russia has to take the decisive actions towards this end.
Until and unless Russia realizes that to be fully included in Europe it must act in a European manner and conform to European standards, it will suffer repeated frustrations, losses, and assaults to its own excessive great power chauvinism. For Russia to be integrated with Europe, it must join the political and normative community that now makes up the West. Russia's atavistic outlook precludes its full integration into Europe and thus its own democracy, peace, prosperity, and security.
The Balkans.
Sadly, the conference hardly addressed the Balkans. One fears again that this omission was not accidental but reflects either exhaustion with the problems of the former Yugoslavia, a lack of answers, or unwillingness to truly think through the requirements of lasting solutions to Balkan problems. The problems here are well-known and typify the new security threats, failing states, ethnopolitical conflict, peace operations, criminality, and so on. A Greek speaker indicated the basic orientation of goodwill that now characterizes Greek policy, most importantly includes its policy towards Turkey. Nevertheless Cyprus's status must be addressed, and a just and comprehensive solution found. In the Balkans as a whole, peace, stability, and regional economic integration are preconditions for prosperity and an undefined "arms prevention" program might be useful in stopping current revisionist states or movements. Finally, Russia's interests here are especially important to it, so Russian interests must be considered and acknowledged in any lasting solution.
However, these points are all well-known or truisms. They do not tell us how to get there from here. Nor did anyone at the conference seem to have an idea how to bring about NATO's stated objective, a Kosovo under some form of Serbia's formal, but legitimate, sovereignty. Clearly, unless some real solution to the Kosovo and Bosnia problems is found, Macedonia and those two entities will continue to be insecure and NATO forces will be deployed there until somebody devises a workable outcome. Indeed, NATO members are quietly preparing to stay in Macedonia longer than the agreement for 30 days to help disarm the Albanian rebels there because of the deep skepticism that they will collect a meaningful number of weapons, stop weapons smuggling into Macedonia, or that either or both sides will then keep the peace.
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To say this is not to dismiss the staggering complexities of Balkan issues. But having accepted the burden of collective security and crisis management there, NATO is now the Balkans' security manager. NATO cannot evade its responsibilities to find a viable solution without compromising its aspirations to be Europe's primary effective security provider. NATO cohesion, the success of future enlargements, and many other critical issues now depend upon successful resolution of Balkan issues. As in the past, Balkan and European security are inextricable.
Conclusions.
That last point is another way of stating the indivisibility of European security. Europe cannot be part secure and part insecure. This is the fundamental rationale for an enlargement process that must ultimately be taken in Russia and Ukraine. This need not be accomplished all at once, but we must think about how it can be done and take the required actions. However, absent allied consensus concerning the threats to Europe and how to meet them, that denouement will be a long time in coming. And that end game also requires cooperation from elites in Russia, Ukraine, and the Balkans who have hitherto not fully accepted or have impeded European integration. While they must be invited to the party, they cannot be allowed to crash it and impose their own values and demands upon the other guests.
This conference was very frank and wide-ranging, but ultimately could not come to terms with issues beyond the Russo-Polish border. Once the EU enlarges to the Baltic, and Poland and those states accept the Schengen borders that are part of the EU's conditions for membership, that border will be the temporary dividing line in Europe. But it cannot be allowed to harden into a lasting one. Like the other preceding lines that divided Europe, it must come down so that all of Europe can realize the blessings of security, prosperity, peace, and democracy. This conference only sketched out some of the markings, signs, and detours along the road to European integration. In the future we must travel down that road and, while avoiding those pitfalls, push that road further into hitherto unexplored areas. For if we do not do so, we will not be able to avoid even the pitfalls that we clearly see now. Then, rather than moving forward, we will regress to a new, unforeseeable, undefinable, but clearly retrograde point. And at that point, the goal of Europe whole and free will only signify what we have lost, not what we want.
